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Abstract
This paper studies a novel negotiation protocol in settings in
which players need to exchange resources in order to achieve
their own objective, but are uncertain about the objectives of
other participants. The protocol allows participants to request
each other to disclose their interests at given points in the
negotiation. Revealing information about participants’ needs
may facilitate agreement, but it also exposes their negotiation
strategy to the exploitation of others. Empirical studies were
conducted using computer-mediated negotiation scenarios that
provided an analogue to the way goals and resources interact in
the world. The scenarios varied in the individual positions and
interests of participants, as well as the dependency relation-
ships that hold between participants. Results show that those
who choose to reveal their underlying goals outperform nego-
tiators in the same setting that use a protocol that forbids reve-
lation. In addition, goal revelation has a positive effect on the
aggregate performance of negotiators, and on the likelihood to
reach agreement. Further analysis show goal revelation to be a
cooperation mechanism by which negotiators are able to iden-
tify acceptable agreements in scenarios characterized by few
socially (Pareto) beneﬁcial outcomes.
Introduction
Goalsandincentivesarekeydeterminantsofhumanbehavior,
but in many negotiation scenarios there is lack of information
about the underlying interests of participants. Often, this pre-
vents the parties from reaching a beneﬁcial agreement. Con-
sider a bank who is offering to purchasethe majority of shares
of a struggling company in return for potential job cuts. The
unions may not allow the company to accept the offer because
they refuse to agree to layoffs. However, if the bank discloses
that it is committed to keeping the company aﬂoat, the unions
may agree to the buy-out if layoffs are minimal. On the other
hand, revealing goals is often associated with a cost. Having
realized that the bank does not intend to liquidate the com-
pany, the unions may demand no job cuts.
This work studies the trade-offs associated with different
negotiation protocols in settings where self-interested parties
lack information about each other’s aims. We consider strate-
gic settings which require an agreement on the allocation of
scarce resources among self-interested parties. Participants
take turns proposing take-it-or-leave-it deals to each other un-
der time constraints, and communication is associated with a
cost. With no certain knowledge of each other’s goals, the
offers of participants serve as a “noisy signal” to their true
objectives. It is difﬁcult to locate efﬁcient trades for both par-
ties in such conditions, either because participants may re-
quest more than they need, or because there are simply too
many combinations of possible agreements to try out under
time constraints.
In these conditions, revealing the objectives of one or more
oftheparticipantsmayfacilitateagreement, becausetheaddi-
tional information narrows the “search space” of possible of-
fers, and may reveal new avenues of negotiation that were not
known before. However, it is not obvious that the revelation
of information by either party will necessarily improve the
result of the negotiation. Goal revelation is potentially costly,
because it exposes the revealing party’s position and negoti-
ation strategies. For example, a participant that revealed its
goals could have exposed itself to be very selﬁsh in its past
offers, and this may adversely affect the quality of the deals
they are offered in the future.
This paper proposes a novel interest-based negotiation pro-
tocol in task settings, in which parties can prompt each other
to reveal their goals at ﬁxed points within the negotiation pro-
cess. This protocol is inspired by recent negotiation proto-
cols that allow participants to exchange information about be-
liefs, goals or social aspects (Rahwan et al., 2003). We com-
pare this interest-based protocol with an alternative position-
based protocol where goal revelation is not allowed. We mea-
sured people’s behavior under each of these protocols using a
computer-mediated testbed comprising a conceptually simple
game in which players negotiate and exchange resources to
enablethemtoachievetheirindividualgoals. Thistestbedhas
been used previously to analyze the decision-making strate-
gies people deploy when interacting with computers, and the
comparison of these strategies with those that people deploy
when interacting with other people (Gal, Pfeffer, Marzo, &
Grosz, 2004). The advantage of this testbed for studying
interest-based negotiation is two-fold: First, it presents a real-
istic analogue to the ways in which goals, tasks and resources
interact in real-world settings, but it abstracts away the com-
plexities of speciﬁc domains. Second, it supports transpar-
ent, anonymous communication between subjects who are
interacting together in laboratory conditions, avoiding exper-
imenter effects and face-to-face communication.
We conducted experiments in which different subjects in-
teracted with each other using either interest- or position-
based protocols on the same set of negotiation scenarios.
These scenarios varied in the dependency relationships that
hold between players (i.e., who needs whom), as well as the
number of integrative (mutually beneﬁcial) exchanges. Re-
sults show that goal revelation using interest-based negoti-
ation protocols leads to a higher likelihood of agreement,
and a signiﬁcant increase in beneﬁt to the revealing player,
as compared to the beneﬁt obtained using the position-based
protocol. In addition, using the interest-based protocol it-
self has a positive effect on the social beneﬁt to both parties
which is signiﬁcantly higher than the social beneﬁt obtained
using the position-based protocol. Further analysis revealed
that interest-based negotiation is essentially a mechanism by
2614which dependent players who reveal their goals are assisted
by independent players, while not incurring a loss to their
own beneﬁt, as compared to using position-based protocols.
There are few works offering an empirical analysis of
people’s negotiation strategies in repeated interactions. Ru-
binstein (1985) has provided a theoretical model for pre-
scribing negotiating strategies in such settings that are op-
timal under certain conditions (e.g., participants are ratio-
nal and consistent in their beliefs about each other’s objec-
tives). Work in the psychological literature about strategic in-
teraction has focused on speciﬁc domains (e.g., seller-buyer
disputes (G. Loewenstein, Bazerman, & Thompson, 1989),
mid-east peace talks (Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007)) or
completely abstract settings such as the Prisoners Dilemma.
Loewenstein and Brett (2007) conducted a study which stud-
ied how goal framing prior to the negotiation procedure af-
fects strategy revision. None of these works have compared
the effects of goal revelation directly within repeated negoti-
ation. Work by Heiskanen, Ehtamo, and Hamalaien (2001)
has found that people minimize the amount of private infor-
mation they reveal in negotiation to avoid weakening their
positions, while Vorauer and Claude (1998) observes that ne-
gotiators overestimate their partners’ beliefs about their own
goals in certain conditions. We show that when using a medi-
ated protocol for goal solicitation and revelation, negotiators
are willing to disclose private information to others and that
this allows them to reach mutual beeneﬁcal agreements.
Work in automated negotiation in Artiﬁcial Intelligence
(AI) has proposed algorithms for argumentative strategies
which support or attack the different positions of parties in a
negotiation (Kraus, Sycara, & Evenchik, 1998). These algo-
rithms have been used by computational agents and several
works have studied conditions under which such strategies
outperform position-based protocols (Kakas & Pavlos, 2006;
Rahwan, Pasquier, Sonenberg, & Dignum, 2007). This work
directly extends these studies by showing that argumentative-
type protocols are advantageous to people.
The Colored Trails Game
Colored Trails (CT) is a testbed developed for investigating
the decision-making that arises in task settings, where the key
interactions are among goals, tasks required to accomplish
those goals, and resources needed to perform the tasks 1. The
empirical investigations described in this paper used a partic-
ular conﬁguration of CT that is played by 2 players on a 5x5
board of colored squares. Each player had a designated goal
square and a piece on the board, initially located in one of
the non-goal squares. At the onset of a CT game, players are
issued a set of 7 colored chips chosen from the same palette
as the squares. To move a piece into an adjacent square a
player must turn in a chip of the same color as the square.
Chips represent resources in CT, and at the heart of the game
is players’ ability to negotiate over these resources. Thus,
chips may be exchanged by the players, and the conditions of
1CT can be downloaded at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/ai/ct
(a) Main and Pending Offer Panels
(b) Decision-support tool
Figure 1: Snapshot of a CT Game using an Interest-Based
Negotiation Protocol
exchange may be varied to model different decision-making
situations. The colors of the chips issued to players and the
tiles on the board are drawn from a common 4-color palette.
Players had full view of the board and each others’ chips and
positions, but they could only see their own goal location.
A CT game comprises three phases. In the communica-
tion phase, players alternated between one of two roles: pro-
poser players could offer some subset of their chips to be ex-
changed with some subset of the chips of responder players;
responder players could in turn accept or reject proposers’
offers. If no offer was made, or if each offer was declined,
then both players are left with their initial allocation of chips.
The game controller prevents players for offering chips they
do not have, or asking for chips the other does not have. In
the exchange phase, chip exchanges were enforced by the
game controller (if an agreement was reached). Finally, in the
movement phase, the game controller automatically moved
both players as close as possible to the goal square. The scor-
ing function for players depended solely on their own perfor-
mance: 100 points for reaching the goal; 10 points for each
tile left in a player’s possession; 15 points deducted for any
square in the shortest path between a player’s ﬁnal position
and goal-square (in case the goal was not reached). These
parameters were chosen so that getting to the goal was by
2615far the most important component, but if a player could not
get to the goal it was preferable to get as close to the goal
as possible. The score that each player received if no offer
was made was identical to the score each player received if
the offer was rejected by the responder. We refer to this score
as the no negotiation alternative and to the score that each
player received if the offer was accepted by the responder as
the proposed outcome score.
Snapshots of the CT graphical user interface (GUI) for the
interest-basedprotocolofoneofthegamesusedintheexperi-
mentisshowninFigure1. TheMain“Window”panel, shown
in Figure 1a, includes the board game, the goal square, repre-
sented by an icon displaying the symbol Gme, and two icons,
“me” and “O”, representing the location of the two players
on the board at the onset of the game.2 The bottom part of
the “Main Window” panel, titled “chips”, shows the chip dis-
tributions for the players. In the game shown here, the “me”
player can get to the goal square, using the path that is out-
lined on the board, but the “O” player is lacking the chips to
get to the goal (note that O’s goal is not shown here). The
“me” player has received an offer asking it for 1 purple chip
in return for 1 green chip. A proposer uses the “Propose Ex-
change” panel, to make an offer to a responder, or to ask for
theother’sgoal. The“PathFinder”panel, showninFigure1b,
provides decision support tools to be used during the game.
It displays a list of path suggestions to the goal, the missing
chips required to fulﬁl a potential path, the surplus chips left
overonceapotentialpathhasbeenfulﬁlled, andthebestposi-
tion the agent can reach relative to its scoring function. These
pathsareoptimizedforagivenchipdistributionandplayer, as
queried by the player, such that they represent the best route
given a player’s objectives. Agents can view this information
for the chip set that is currently in their possession, or for any
hypothetical chip set.3
Analogy with Task Settings
CT provides a realistic analog to task settings, highlighting
the interaction among goals, tasks required to achieve these
goals, and resources needed for completing tasks. Chips
correspond to agent capabilities and skills required to fulﬁll
tasks. Different squares on the board represent different types
of tasks. A player’s possession of a chip of a certain color
corresponds to having the skill available for use at a time.
Not all players possess chips in all colors, much as different
agents vary in their capabilities. Traversing a path through
the board corresponds to performing a complex task whose
constituents are the individual tasks represented by the colors
of each square. There can be several paths on the board to get
to the goal, as there are several ways of completing a task. It
has been shown that people are more likely to engage in coop-
erative behavior when using this game than when using com-
pletely abstract representations such as payoff matrices (Gal,
2CT colors have been converted to grey scale in this ﬁgure.
3Players can query the path ﬁnder about the other player only if
it has revealed its goals, and never query the path ﬁnder in position-
based protocol.
Grosz, Shieber, Pfeffer, & Allain, 2007).
Interest- and Position-Based Protocols in CT
We now describe the implementation of interest- and
position-based protocols in CT. In both protocols, neither
player can see the goal of the other at the onset of the game,
and players are randomly allocated as proposers or respon-
ders. In the communication phase, a proposer can make an
offer to the responder, as shown in Figure 1a.
In the position-based protocol, once a responder receives
an offer, it can accept it, in which case the offer is realized,
both players automatically move towards the goal, and the
game ends. If the responder rejects the offer, the game con-
trollerreversestheplayers’roles, andthenewproposerplayer
(formerly the responder) can make an offer to the new respon-
der player (formerly the proposer). A state-based representa-
tion of this protocol is shown in Figure 2a.
The interest-based protocol is an extension of the position-
based protocol that allows players, in a controlled fashion, to
ask about, and reveal, their goals. Once a responder receives
an offer from the proposer, it has the option to ask the pro-
poser for its goal, in addition to rejecting or accepting the of-
fer. If the responder chooses not to ask for the goal, the game
proceeds as in the position-based negotiation case. If the re-
sponder chooses to ask the proposer for its goal, the proposer
now has the option to agree to reveal its goal, or to make
another offer to the responder, which is effectively a rejec-
tion of the revelation request. Responders may ask proposers
for their goals numerous time, but once a goal is revealed,
it cannot be asked about, or revealed, again. A state-based
representation of this protocol is presented in Figure 2b.
In both conditions, the players are allowed a maximum of
4 minutes to interact in the communication phase until they
reach an agreement. If no offer is accepted, the communi-
cation phase terminates with no agreement. In both cases,
the movement phase is initiated and both players are moved
towards their goals given the result of the negotiation.
Empirical Methodology
We refer to the session involving the interest-based negoti-
ation protocol as the IBN condition, and the session involv-
ing position-based negotiation protocol as the PBN condition.
Twenty-two subject participated in the experiment, drawn
from a pool of students and adults residing in the Boston
area. Twelve people participated in the IBN condition while
ten people participated in the PBN condition. Each person
was given an identical 30 minute tutorial on CT, and played 3
practice rounds. Each subject was identiﬁed by a serial num-
ber, was seated in front of a terminal for the entire length of
the experiment, and could not see or speak to any of the other
participants. A central server was responsible for matching
up the participants at each round and for keeping the total
score for each subject in all rounds of the experiment. Each
subject participated in a series of CT games, but no subject
was paired up with any other subject more than once, and
subjects were not told about the identity of their counterparts.
2616(a) Position-Based Negotiation Protocol
(Goal Revelation disallowed)
(b) Interest-Based Negotiation Protocol
(Goal Revelations allowed)
Figure2: TwoAlternativeProtocolsforRepeatedNegotiation
Participants were paid in a manner consistent with their ag-
gregate scores in all of the games they played. Between each
game, players engaged in a neutral activity which did not af-
fect their payment (answering questions about their mood),
designed to minimize the effects of past games on their future
performance. In addition, subjects scores were not revealed
at any point during the experiment.
The games in each condition were generated to meet the
following criteria:
 It was not possible for both players to reach their respective
goals independently. This ensures that it is worthwhile for
players to negotiate.
 Either player can reach its goal with the other’s help, but
it may not be possible for both players to reach the goal.
This ensures that in any game, it is potentially possible for
at least one player to reach its goal.
 The players and their respective goals must be in either the
same row or column of the board. This constraint allows
the player one shortest path to the goal, and makes it easier
to consider alternative paths that may be realized due to
goal revelation.
For each game, we recorded the board and chip settings, as
well as the actions of both players and their associated scores
in the game.
We hypothesized that players’ ability to reveal their goals
inCTwillleadthemtoidentifyalternativeplansontheboard,
different from the paths they were meaning to take before the
goal revelation. Consequently, chips that were meant to be
used for the original path may be “released” and potentially
help the other player. We expected that this information will
help players reach more beneﬁcial agreements for both par-
ties.
Results
Goal Revelations All Games
1, 2
Revealing Player 41 / 23 38 / 38
Soliciting Player 8 / 9 34 / 32
Combined 49 / 32 72 / 61
Table 1: Average beneﬁt in IBN/PBN condition for different
number of goal revelations (signiﬁcant difference shown in
bold)
We base the following results on the same 65 games that
were played in both conditions. In 14 of these games players
were co-dependent (both players needed each other to get to
the goal) and in the other 51 games one of the players needed
the other player. We refer to a participants that queried their
counterpart about their goal as a “goal solicitor,” and to those
players that subsequently revealed their goal as “goal reveal-
ers”. We will also use the term “goal revealers” in the PBN
condition, despite the fact that there is no revelation in this
condition. In the PBN condition, this term refers to those
players who align with goal revealers in the equivalent set of
games in the IBN condition (and similarly for goal solicitors).
Table 1 shows the average beneﬁt to revealers and solic-
itors in games played in the IBN condition (left entry) and
the PBN condition (right entry). The beneﬁt to a player in
a game is deﬁned as the proposed outcome score minus the
no negotiation alternative score. If no agreement is reached, a
player’s beneﬁt is zero. The results are measured with respect
to the total set of games played in both conditions (column
marked “All Games”) and with respect to the games in which
one or two goals were revealed in the IBN condition (column
marked “Goal Revelations”). Recall that these same games
were also played in the PBN condition.
As shown in the table, the combined average beneﬁt for
players in the IBN condition was 49, which is 17 points
greater in cases where there was at least one goal revelation
(SE =5, paired t-testt(29)=1:7;p=0:04). There was an in-
signiﬁcant 5 points point difference between conditions in the
combined beneﬁt for those games in which no revelations oc-
curred (SE = 2, paired t-test t(34) = 0:5;p = 0:28). We can
conclude that revelation itself has a positive effect on play-
ers’ social beneﬁt. This is because there was a combined ad-
vantage to players in the IBN condition when the number of
revelations was greater than zero, but not when this number
equalled zero. In addition, it turns out that this advantage is
signiﬁcant enough to affect players’ total performance. As
2617IBN
agreement failure
PBN
agreement 11 7
failure 16 31
Table 2: Pairwise Agreement Ratio
Goal Revelations All Games
0 1, 2
indep. player 19 / 0 -9 / -15 15 / -2
dep. player 49 / 59 56 / 35 40 / 50
Table 3: Average beneﬁt in IBN/PBN conditions for different
player dependencies (signiﬁcant difference in bold)
shown by the table, the combined average beneﬁt for play-
ers in all games was 72, which is 10 points greater in the
IBN condition than in the PBN condition (SE = 3, paired test
t(64) = 1:60;p = 0:04). Note that in total, there were more
goal solicitors than goal revealers, and thus the numbers in
the “combined” row do not necessarily equal the summation
of “revealing” and “soliciting” players.
Table 1 shows that in both conditions, the beneﬁt to goal
solicitors is signiﬁcantly less than the beneﬁt to goal reveal-
ers. It also shows that revealers in the IBN condition in-
creased their beneﬁt by 18 points, as compared to the cor-
responding games in the PBN condition (SE = 3;t(29) =
1:7;p = 0:04). However, there was no signiﬁcant difference
in the beneﬁt between those players that solicited goals in the
IBN condition (8 points) and the corresponding games in the
PBN condition (9 points. Solicitors in the IBN condition did
not lose more beneﬁt than did the corresponding players in
the PBN condition. We hypothesized that seeing the reveal-
ers’ goals allowed solicitors to offer revealers the chips they
needed, in return for chips they did not need. The correspond-
ing player in the PBN condition could not make this kind of
offer.
Table 2 presents a pairwise comparison between the num-
ber of agreements in both conditions. As can be seen in the
table, 16 of the games that resulted in agreement in the IBN
condition had failed in the PBN condition. In contrast, only
7 of the games that succeeded in the PBN condition failed to
reach agreement in the IBN condition, and this difference was
statistically signiﬁcant (c2(1;N = 65) = 3:92;p = 0:04).
The Effect of Players’ Dependency Relationships
Table 3 shows the beneﬁt to players as a function of their
dependencies, as well as the number of goals they revealed.
As shown by the table, the beneﬁt for dependent players was
consistently higher than the beneﬁt for independent players,
across conditions. In particular, in those games in the IBN
condition where at least one goal was revealed (and the cor-
responding games in the PBN conditions) they were willing
to make a sacriﬁce. This generosity is considerably more
effective in the IBN condition, where the average beneﬁt to
dependent players is 19 points greater than in the PBN con-
dition (SE = 2:3;t(26) = 2;p = 0:02). Despite the sacriﬁce
incurred by independent players when goals were revealed,
their overall beneﬁt in the IBN condition is 15 points, 17
points greater than the beneﬁt of players in the PBN condi-
tion (SE = 2:3;t(48) = 2:3;p = 0:01). This is primarily due
to their signiﬁcant gain of 19 points over their PBN scores in
IBN games where no goals were revealed.
Lastly, we note that there were signiﬁcantly more depen-
dent revealers than independent revealers (27 vs. 8). and
more independent solicitor than dependent solicitor (24 vs.
11). This explains the ﬁnding of Table 1 that the beneﬁt of
solicitors is signiﬁcantly less than the beneﬁt of revealers. So-
licitors are likely to be independent players, and assist those
dependent players that reveal their goals.
Table 4 shows the number of games that resulted in agree-
ment as a function of the dependency relationship between
players. As can be shown by the table, in both condi-
tions, co-dependent players were signiﬁcantly more likely to
reach agreement than dependent players (Fisher’s exact test
p < 0:01). We also found that the combined performance for
co-dependent games was higher than that of single-dependent
games, but this difference was not signiﬁcant, perhaps be-
cause of the low number of co-dependent games. In all, there
single-dep co-dep total
IBN 33 (64%) 14 (100%) 47
PBN 26 (50%) 12 (85%) 38
Table 4: Agreement Frequencies
were9moreacceptancesintheIBNconditionthantherewere
in the PBN condition (47 compared to 38), and this difference
was statistically signiﬁcant (paired t-test, p < 0:05).
Analysis of the IBN Protocol
We now report results relating solely to a set of 112 games
played in the IBN condition. This includes additional games
that were not played in the IBN condition due to time con-
straints. Most IBN games did not feature goal revelations,
but players revealed their goals the majority (76%) of times
they were actually asked. There were 39 games in which one
goal was revealed, and 10 games in which two goals were re-
vealed, making for a total of 59 revelations. In all, at least one
goal was revealed in 43% of the games. The majority of goal
revelations (72%) were performed by dependent players, sig-
niﬁcantly higher than the number of revelations performed by
independent players (c2(1) = 6:1;p = 0:01). This conﬁrms
the trend shown for the smaller set of games in the previous
section.
We also found that it is worthwhile for players to re-
veal goals: The average beneﬁt for revealers was 64 when
agreement was reached, 24 points higher than the beneﬁt
in games where agreement was reached without revelation
2618Figure 3: Distribution of games featuring goal solicitations
for different numbers of Pareto optimal outcomes possible
(SE = 4:3;t(146) =  2:32;p = :01). As can be expected,
this trend was reversed for goal solicitors, whose beneﬁt in
the case where goals were revealed was 22, about 30 points
lower than in the case when they were not revealed (SE =
5;t(146) =  2:8;p = :02).
We conclude with a summary of goal solicitation behav-
ior against the availability of Pareto optimal outcomes 4. As
shown by Figure 3, a low number of Pareto optimal offers
possible in a game results in a greater likelihood that solic-
itation will occur at some point in that game. However, in
games that feature higher numbers of Pareto optimal offers,
the trend is reversed, and players are less likely to solicit the
goal location of their opponents. This would imply that hu-
man negotiators’ use of goal solicitation is not random, but
is inﬂuenced at least partially by the difﬁculty of the negoti-
ation, the estimation of which correlates with the number of
Pareto optimal possible offers.
Discussion and Conclusion
The results shown in the last section establish the role of
interest-based negotiation protocols as a mechanism of coop-
eration in which independent parties solicit dependent parties
to reveal information for the purpose of beneﬁting them. We
saw that dependent players are likely to agree to reveal their
goals once asked, and that this information is not abused by
solicitors. Indeed, they choose to use this information as a
tool for assisting the revealers, while succeeding not to incur
a loss themselves. This results in a net gain to the revealer,
as well as an increase the social beneﬁt of both participants.
Lastly, this mechanism is not overused by participants. Solic-
itors generally dislike to ask for others’ goals, and choose to
do so mainly in cases where there are few avenues open for
beneﬁcial exchanges.
In future work, we plan to conduct further experiments in
which players engage in position-based negotiation, but can
observe each other’s goals. We mean to compare players’
performance in those games where goal revelations were so-
licited in the IBN condition, to see whether the solicitation
4An offer is Pareto optimal if no other offer exists that is more
beneﬁcial to at least one of the players.
itself (as opposed to simply viewing each others’ goals) had
an effect on players’ performance. Also, we intend to use this
data to build better automated negotiation agents based on
a sound understanding of how humans negotiate using such
tools.
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